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Abstract 
The employment policy is one of the most disputable areas between Turkey and the EU. The EU declared 
two opening conditions, one about union rights and the other one about preparing an action plan 
displaying step by step the transposing of EU laws. Although Turkey claims that she met those criteria, the 
EU insists on keeping the accession negotiations in this area closed. However, there is serious gap between 
Turkish and European employment policies and in order to comply with the EU’s, there is a strong need of 
enthusiasm in Turkey for proper implementation of changes made in legal and institutional structures. 
Simultaneously, the EU has to offer a considerable incentive, e.g. membership, for Turkey to encourage her 
to adapt EU rules in employment policy. Unfortunately, it is argued in this paper that the current situation 
is the opposite, i.e. there is no substantial incentive from the EU to encourage Turkey and thus, no 
enthusiasm from Turkey to comply with the EU policy. In order to analyze the impact of the EU on 
Turkey’s employment policy the main question designed in this paper is: ‘To what extent does the EU have 
influence on policy convergence in a candidate country that does not have a clear membership 
perspective? ‘. It is argued in this study that “without a concrete incentive, European Union’s impact on a 
candidate country would be limited”.  Thus, the patterns of policy change at the national level are the 
dependent variable to be observed. The European Union’s conditionality is the independent variable that is 
expected to alter the national patterns.  
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Introduction 
Turkey has been waiting at the gate of the EU since its initial application of 1959.  The relationship between Turkey 
and the EU has never been a stable one.  Most of the 70s and 80s were the times of inertia in Turkey-EU relations, 
even at the time of the 1980 coup in Turkey the connection between the EU and Turkey had almost lost. The 80s were 
the time for Turkey of restructuring its economy from a heavily state controlled one to a more liberalized one and 
redefining its external relations of which Turkey became more open to outer world especially to West instead of being 
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a relatively isolated country. The era of economic development and political dynamism encouraged Turkey in 1980s 
and since late 1980s, Turkey has demonstrated a political enthusiasm for integration with the EU and, acted more 
willingly to fulfill the requirements of this objective. In 1990s, relations gained accelerated with the completion of the 
Customs Union. Although after not being announced as an applicant country in Luxembourg Summit of 1997, to 
some extent, the relations got frozen. At the Helsinki Summit of 1999, Turkey has been announced as an applicant 
country and the EU and Turkey got closer and their relations became more institutionalized. Since the Brussels 
Summit of 2004, where the EU granted Turkey the date for accession negotiations, the relationship between Turkey 
and the EU has taken the current shape.   
Turkey, since Helsinki Summit but especially after the Brussels Summit of 2004, is dealing with the issue of 
integration with the EU acquis, which could be found in 33 topics of accession negotiations. It is seemed that in most 
fields; Turkey’s legal structure, methods of application and determination to apply those legal rules and Turkey’s 
institutional structure are not quite compatible with that of the EU’s. In some fields this incompatibility seems to be 
easily overcome, however, in most areas the incompatibility seems very hard to be carried out. 
Policy of “conditionality” can be defined as a salient strategy of the EU against candidate countries. However, simple 
implementation of conditionality cannot basically explain the bases of governance and the conditions in which the 
candidate countries comply with the EU rules. EU conditionality might be seemed comprehensive, but it does not 
always end with the convergence of certain policy areas or complying of some countries. Thus, it is required to make 
a distinction analytically between the use of ‘conditionality’ as a political strategy and its causal impact on domestic 
politics. The dominant logic supporting EU conditionality is a bargaining strategy of influencing by reward, under 
which the EU provides incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions.  
The employment policy is one of the most disputable areas between Turkey and the EU. The EU declared two 
opening conditions, one about union rights and the other one about preparing an action plan displaying step by step 
the transposing of EU laws. Although Turkey claims that she met those criteria, the EU insists on keeping the 
accession negotiations in this area closed. The employment issue has always been an important problem for Turkey. 
Since 1960s Turkey claimed herself as being a social welfare state, and as a welfare state one of her integral problems 
have always been to solve problems in the employment area. Especially, since 1980s, Turkey faced the dilemma of 
economic growth without creating new jobs, thus could not decrease the unemployment rates. Eventually, although it 
is claimed that Turkey is a social state, in order to keep unemployment at a certain level Turkey produced a pro-
employer employment policy. Especially, job security and wages kept at quite a low level with the claimed purpose of 
politicians not discouraging employers to recruit people.  Moreover, for some political and ideological reasons, the 
right of association in many areas, including employment, has been destroyed and had not been let to be properly 
reestablished since 1980s, thus the number, rights and power of organized employees, i.e. trade unions, which may 
struggle to improve the rights of the workers, are very limited. Consequently, there is a serious gap between Turkish 
and European employment policies and in order to comply with the EU’s, there is a strong need of enthusiasm in 
Turkey for proper implementation of changes made in legal and institutional structures. Simultaneously, the EU has to 
offer a considerable incentive, e.g. membership, for Turkey to encourage her to adapt EU rules in employment policy. 
Unfortunately, it is argued in this paper that the current situation is the opposite, i.e. there is no substantial incentive 
from the EU to encourage Turkey and thus, no enthusiasm from Turkey to comply with the EU policy. 
In order to analyze the impact of the EU on Turkey’s employment policy the main question designed in this paper is: 
‘To what extent does the EU have influence on policy convergence in a candidate country that does not have a clear 
membership perspective? ‘Employment and Social Policy chapter in accession negotiations between Turkey and the 
EU has been chosen as the case of this research as providing to have an answer on this question. In order to carry out 
the research more systemically, four secondary questions have been formulized as: What are the theories that explain 
policy convergence? What is European Employment approach? What are the expectations from Turkey and the 
changes occurred in Turkish employment policy? Do any of the integration theories fit in this case?  Thus, the main 
objective of this paper is ‘analyzing the extent of EU influence on Turkish employment policy.’ Furthermore, it is 
argued in this study that “without a concrete incentive, European Union’s impact on a candidate country would be 
limited”.   
The main focus of the study would be upon the policy convergence on employment policy that took place since the 
starting of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU. Therefore, the patterns of policy change at national 
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level are the dependent variable to be observed. The European Union’s conditionality is the independent variable that 
is expected to alter the national patterns.  
The Means of EU Conditionality: A Theoretical Framework 
Theoretically and empirically, measuring the influence of the EU on candidate countries has been a tough issue. 
Theoretically, the literature on Europeanization is usually deals with EU governance, institutional change, 
supranational policy formulation, policy convergence in member states (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, The 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, 2005). Moreover, even if literature deals with a candidate country, 
empirically, domestic structures of subject countries, and the EU perception of those countries and the incentives 
offered by the EU to them are usually neglected. Although the number of literature dealing with non-member states is 
increasing, the bulk of the literature on EU influence on domestic structures generally dealt with member states not 
candidate countries (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, Introduction: Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and 
Eastern Europe, 2005). However, the most interesting cases for Europeanization, like Turkey and other candidate or 
neighbor countries, left understudied as the literature progress to investigate the particular instruments of EU effect 
(Knill & Lehmkuhl , 2003), (Borzell & Risse, 2003).    This makes for a substantial selection preference that affects 
the outcomes of academic inquiry. However, the dependent variable constitutes the basic conceptual problem that 
what is measured when the European Impact is measured. Compliance of the candidate states with the EU rule has 
been analyzed by many researchers, such as: transposition of EU law into their national laws, convergence of some 
policy areas, institutional change and   changing domestic political and economic practices substantially formulized in 
Copenhagen Criteria and Maastricht Criteria.  
The measures mentioned above are not enough to fully explain the compound ways hoe the candidate countries 
respond the efforts come from the EU. The reason why the Europeanization scholarship have a tendency to overstate 
successful cases and understate unsuccessful Europeanization attempts, supposing that, in time, the states that reacted 
negatively would come along with the EU rules and ideas and leave their undemocratic or old fashioned ways of 
politics and policy making by persistent and constant pressure from the EU, through mechanisms of coercion, 
socialization, or persuasion (Schimmelfennig, 2000), (Kelley, 2004). However, against various explanatory tools 
conceptualized by Europeanization literature, it is observed that in general Europeanization concept and in particular 
some explanatory tools of Europeanization are quite limited in explaining Turkey – EU relations.  
Top-down approach is quite common in analyzing European impact on Turkey, which is considered a basic and direct 
rule transfer from the EU to Turkey (Ugur, 2008). Thus, policy formulation procedures and processes at the EU level 
and interaction between Turkey and the EU are neglected. Accordingly, a conceptual differentiation between EU-
ization, which is simply adoption of EU acquis, and Europeanization, which have wider and deeper implications at 
societal level, have to be considered (Kaliber, 2008). Moreover, the concepts of adopting a policy and implementing a 
policy are not clearly distinguished in most of the Europeanization studies (Müftüler Baç, 2005). Therefore, Turkey’s 
inactivity in implementation of the policies which had already been adopted is usually neglected. Furthermore, as 
most of the other polities in the world, external relations of the EU are affected by internal events such as deepening, 
enlargement or economic crisis etc. However, most of the scholars fail to see the internal dynamics of the EU in 
Turkey – EU relations (Kahraman, 2000). Especially, the notion of “absorbing capacity of the EU” is quite prevalent 
among EU scholars who are uneasy about Turkey’s full membership to the EU.  
Additionally, the meaning of the Europeanization is controversial, especially in EU – Turkey relations. First group 
scholars tend to explain Europeanization as a tool for responding instant domestic economic interests of Turkey. 
Accordingly, Turkey’s Europeanization is based on cost-benefit calculations. Thus, if the benefits, essentially 
economic ones, are more than the costs then the domestic actors allow for some alteration (Noutcheva, 2009). 
Although, this assumption explains some cases occurred among Turkey and the EU such as closing rapidly the 
Science and Research chapter of the negotiations, it sometimes fails to formulate some occasions such as Turkey’s 
joining to Customs Union. Turkey is the only country that joined the Customs Union even before being declared as a 
formal candidate to membership at that time. Openly, Turkey have had no immediate economic or strategic gain from 
Customs Union, contrary the consequences of being a part of the Customs Union without full membership have been 
heavily criticized by numerous scholar and politician (Yazıcı, 2012). Arguably, Turkey’s joining to the Customs 
Union was political attempt to approach the EU membership; thus instead of short-term economic interests, long term 
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interests are at the stage. So, defining EU – Turkey relations only by short term economics and strategic interests do 
not always assist to explain the exact point of the case.  
 Furthermore, in Turkey, the concept of Europeanization is sometimes perceived as equivalent to notion of 
Modernization.  In this sense modernization refers to industrialization, technological and scientific advance.  
However, the literature tend to explain Europeanization as modernization typically neglect that the EU is not only a 
technology and industry provider but also a provider of some norms, principles, values and institutions such as human 
rights, working relations, gender relations (Kubicek P. , 2005). Hence, this literature ignores any socialization effect. 
Europeanization is also seen as an identity – building process of Westernization which would convert Turkey from 
being an Eastern country to Western or European country. Therefore, western standards about secularism, liberalism, 
democratic principles, minority and human rights have been set as the objectives to be achieved by Turkey.  
Some limitations of convergence theories, misuse of some terms and deviation in some theoretical concepts 
concerning EU – Turkey relations have been discussed. Hereafter, it is attempted to draw an explanatory theoretical 
framework for policy convergence in EU – candidate country relations based on EU conditionality.  There are several 
theories, especially institutionalist theories such as historical institutionalism, constructive institutionalism or rational 
institutionalism. Nevertheless, only Rational Institutionalism explicitly deals with the effect of conditionality used by 
the EU on candidate countries which is the independent variable of this study.  
The precise demand from the EU improves the possibility of effective compliance of candidate countries to the EU 
rules. By precise demand it is meant that clearly stated EU conditions; and full information and understanding of the 
candidate country about EU rules concerning the issue or area (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2005, p. 8).  However, 
in some cases uncertainty might occur due to lack of a particular EU model in various policy fields, intra-EU conflict 
or evolving rules in the EU, especially in the area of Justice end Home Affairs. The uncertainty negatively affects the 
credibility of the EU conditionality which is a very significant factor.  Credibility can be understood by two ways. 
Firstly, the incentive offered to candidate countries must be given to them after they met the demand from the EU. 
Secondly, the incentives have to be offered only if candidate countries really met the requirements (Kubicek P. , 2003, 
p. 18).  In other words, conditionality works only if it is based on credibility. For example, the debate in EU countries 
about Turkey’s possible accession to the EU causes doubt in Turkey whether in a foreseeable future she will join the 
EU or not and this harms power of the EU entailed from conditionality.  Political preferentialism, hidden intentions or 
side payments to other candidates who have not met all the criteria also harms EU credibility as in the cases of last 
enlargement.  
In the accession negotiations the EU has a higher bargaining position based on asymmetrical interdependence 
(Moravscik & Vachudov, 2003). This advantageous bargaining position provides EU the ability to hold back rewards 
if the conditions have not been met. Moreover, the size of reward also affects the bargaining power of the EU 
(Grabbe, 2003, p. 318). The full membership is the ultimate reward, however, sometimes, as in the case of Turkey’s 
accession, being a member might be a distant objective. In such situations, intermediate rewards become critical. 
Enhancing links and creating institutionalized relations about trade, economics, and politics and information issues 
(Dimitrova & Steunenberg, 2007). For instance including the candidate to some community programs, letting them 
use some extra funds etc.   
The state capacity, adaptation costs and differential empowerment are also effective in EU’s influence.  Rationalist 
Institutionalism argues that if the EU wants to have more influence on a candidate country it has to have domestic 
allies and adaptation costs in the candidate country have to be at reasonable levels (Jacoby, 2010). If the EU demands 
and the interests of domestic actors overlap, then the adaptation cost is expected to be low. Besides, candidate 
countries’ policy convergence may not depend only on adjustment costs, but also on their administrative capacities 
(Toshkov, 2008). Beyond the administrative capacity, some literature suggest that effective implementation of EU 
rules in candidate countries need “strong states and strong civil societies” (Borzel & Buzogany, 2010, p. 161).  
The utmost impact of the EU is in policy dimension. The impact of the EU, according to most studies, is due to the 
conditionality of the EU and reward of credible membership (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, Candidate Countries 
and Conditionality, 2006). Empirical studies in the policy convergence has seen most prominently in the fields of 
regional policy, social policy, environmental, Justice and Home Affairs, and the EU’s internal market regulations. In 
these researches policy convergence between the EU and candidate countries is intensive. Although, each of the 
studies used different explanatory factors, the credible perspective of a membership is an integral dynamic of policy 
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convergence.   In some policy areas there might be some occasional and loose convergence even before the EU 
announced its conditionality; however, convergence increased significantly after EU states its accession conditions 
and monitors the compliance of the candidate country. The EU’s impact on the Central and Eastern European 
Countries and their compliance with EU rules has significantly increased just after the opening of accession 
negotiations which is a strong evidence of the effect of credible membership perspective.   
Although, the empirical studies have found strong influence of the EU in the policy dimension, as mentioned above 
domestic adaptation costs and veto players are also important. The prominent effect of domestic politics can be found 
especially in the areas where the credibility of EU demands is minimal or lacking. For instance, the responds from 
candidate countries to EU’s demand of regionalization (not regional policy) have been quite limited, since the acquis 
does not suggest decentralization and the delegating powers to regional powers, but simply prescribes founding 
statistical units for allocation of structural funds (Bache, 2010). In addition, if the domestic actors use the EU 
conditionality as a central point to achieve their own priorities, again domestic politics would play a significant role 
(Brusis, 2010). Thus, it can be observed that domestic politics, although through different ways and extents, influence 
the policy convergence between the EU and candidate countries.  Moreover it can be argued that if the membership 
perspective of the candidate country is credible and strong even oppositions have become inefficient.   
As stated previously, main aspect that determined the effectiveness of conditionality is a credible membership 
perspective. Accession to the EU is the most important reward and motivation that the EU can offer, but it requires 
being credible. This conclusion derives the question of whether the EU can influence the current candidate states as 
effectively as the previous ones.  Even though, these countries, which are Turkey and Western Balkan countries, have 
a membership perspective in principle, however, the opposition debates in the EU either on enlargement in general or 
accession of a particular country, namely Turkey, reduced the credibility of membership perspective.  The issue of 
credibility is essentially prominent in Turkey. The nature of EU’s conditionality also makes it easier for opposition 
politicians to challenge the legitimacy of EU conditions through spelling nationalistic discourse and exaggerating the 
adaptation costs.  Bearing these negative conditions in mind the influence of the EU would be expected limited in 
those countries.   
Taking all the mentioned insights into consideration it is argued in this study that “the impact of the EU on Turkey in 
general and on employment policy in particular is limited especially compared to other countries that joined the EU in 
previous enlargements.” In the following section the approach of the EU towards employment policy would be 
overviewed in order to find out the policy approach that Turkey is expected to comply.  
The EU Way of Dealing with Employment Problems 
EU set certain rights for workers about health and safety at work, equal opportunities for women and men, protection 
against discrimination, labor law. Member states have to comply with those EU employment rules laid down by 
concerned directives. The EU has the greatest influence on the area of health and safety at work which has a clear 
legislative framework. The directive 89/391/EEC on health and safety at work constitutes the general framework and 
contain measures to improve safety and health at work, such as: encouraging occupational health and safety in all 
sectors, promoting workers’ rights to propose on health and safety issues, and protect workers and ensure their good 
health at the workplace (89/391/EEC, 1989). This directive sets general principles for all sectors of activity; specific 
EU rules concerning health and safety cover the following areas:  
- Workplaces: there are several directives concerning: minimum health and safety requirements for the 
workplaces (89/654/EEC, 1989); temporary and mobile work sites (92/57/EEC , 1992); boreholes 
(92/91/EEC, 1992); surface and underground extraction (92/104/EEC, 1992); protective devices and systems 
in potentially explosive atmospheres (94/9/EC , 1994); work aboard fishing vessels (93/103/EC, 1993); 
onboard medics, information, medical supplies / antidotes (92/29/EEC, 1992) 
- Work Equipment: rules about work equipment have been set in areas of: provision of appropriate equipment 
(89/655/EEC, 1989); manual handling of loads involving risk (90/269/EEC, 1990); display screens: computer 
screens used at work (90/270/EEC, 1990); health and safety signs at work (92/58/EEC , 1992) 
- Categories of workers: the EU also categorized the workers in order to have ability to specifically dealing 
with different categories of workers separately such as: pregnant /recently given birth / breastfeeding 
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(92/85/EEC , 1992); fixed-Term and Temporary agency workers (91/383/EEC , 1991); Young People 
(94/33/EC, 1994); self-Employed Workers (Council Recommendation 2003/134/EC , 2003) 
- Other areas: there are numerous other legal measures concerning health and safety at work regulated by the 
EU in various fields such as:   Physical Agents, Chemical agents, Carcinogenic agents, Asbestos, Biological 
agents, Ergonomics, Occupational diseases, Socio-economic aspects. (European Commission, 2014) 
As it can be observed, the EU seriously deals with health and safety issues at work. It has issued nearly 50 legal 
measures concerning this area touching almost every aspect of working life. These are minimum requirements that 
member states have to oblige; furthering these standards is up to national governments. Thus, it can easily be argued 
that the EU area has a high standard of working healthy and safely.  
In addition to health and safety, EU also focuses on refining living and working conditions and improving procedures 
about informing and consulting workers. The EU moves into mentioned areas through labor law. The EU aims for a 
long time to achieve high employment and strong social protection, to improve living and working conditions and to 
protect social cohesion. Regarding labor law, the EU complements national laws adopted by member states. The 
article 153 of Treaty on the Functioning of the EU provides the right for the EU to legislate in the areas of working 
conditions through regulating working hours, part-time & fixed-term work, posting of workers, informing and 
consulting workers about collective redundancies, transfers of companies, etc. (European Commission, 2014) In these 
areas the EU sets the minimum standards, the national governments are free to improve those standards. The EU labor 
law affects more than 240 million workers in the EU by  providing a clear framework of rights and obligations in the 
workplace, protecting the health of the workforce and, promoting sustainable economic growth (European 
Commission, 2014). The rules of single market is also quite an important issue for employment policy of the EU since 
a fair competition based on the strength the products is desired not an unfair one especially exploiting the labor rights 
and working conditions.  
The employment approach of the EU is quite a strict one. It has basically two main dimensions: first the EU aims to 
provide at least minimum of standards regarding health, safety, working and living conditions, and social cohesion 
among its citizens; second the EU does not want the fair competition to be jeopardized by labor and work related 
inequalities in member states. However, the EU still has some serious problems regarding employment, all those 
standards set by the EU and national governments create a heavy burden for both governments and businesses in the 
EU. They are subject to both a severe global competition and thus, changing rules of businesses which have direct 
effect on employment regimes of member states. So, the EU faced a dilemma of securing the jobs and easing 
businesses to compete with their competitors and adapt the changing rules of business making since 1990s. In other 
words, the labor markets, employment and working conditions wanted to be more flexible on the one hand; in contrast 
there is also a resilient claim to provide security for workers, especially more vulnerable group of workers.  
This two sided situation has found place in the EU discourse since early 1990s. It is first mentioned in 1993 White 
paper of Growth, Competiveness and Employment (European Commission, 1993). First clear formulation of the 
situation has been made in 1997 Green Paper of Partnership for a New Organization of Work which stated that “the 
key issue for employees, management, the social partners and policy makers alike is to strike the right balance 
between flexibility and security” (European Commission, 1997). The dilemma of security and flexibility has also been 
subject to several EU Summits including Essen (1994), Florence (1996), Amsterdam (1997), where the issue has been 
incorporated into Treaty, Luxembourg (1997), Lisbon (2000) and so forth.  It has been developed as a key objective of 
the European Employment Strategy and a great challenge to European Social Model. Lisbon (2000) Summit had been 
the one within others as clearly mentioned need for flexibility but at the same time ensuring security; in its final 
declaration it is stated that “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, 
capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion” (European Council, 
2000).  
Several articles in EU Treaty force the EU to encourage both flexibility of workers and labor markets as well as to 
provide job security.  So, in the EU legal system approaches of flexibility and security gained a legal basis. The search 
for a new balance between flexibility and security has become more apparent in 2002 European Employment 
Strategy. It addresses both security and flexibility in adaptability chapter by inviting social partners “to negotiate and 
implement at all appropriate levels agreements to modernize the organization of work, including flexible working 
arrangements, with the aim of making undertakings productive and competitive, achieving the required balance 
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between flexibility and security, and increasing the quality of jobs”. In the last European Employment Strategy the 
term Flexicurity is officially pronounced and it has been announced as a crucial element of the Employment 
Guidelines and the European Employment Strategy as a whole. Integrated flexicurity policies play a key role in 
modernizing labor markets and contributing to the achievement of the 75% employment rate target set by the Europe 
2020 Strategy (Commission). Accordingly, a new dilemma has been emerged. All parties concerned are required have 
a suitable policy models in order to meet and comply with this new paradigm of flexicurity. Therefore, firstly the 
concept of flexicurity have to be analyzed and its place in and significance in EU employment policy have to be found 
out.  Subsequently, Turkish employment policy against the new European paradigm of flexicurity has to be compared.    
The logic behind the flexicurity approach is to achieve the targets of providing more and better jobs and 
simultaneously reform the European social models. Policies that deal with both the flexibility of labor markets, work 
organization and industrial relations; and employment and social security are needed. So, approach of flexicurity 
targets to ensure an EU citizen a high level employment security (European Commission, 2007). It also targets 
helping employers and workers to catch the prospects brought by globalization.  Thus, it creates an employment 
situation which security and flexibility can be existed together. So, flexicurity can be defined as: combined strategy to 
promote, simultaneously, flexibility and security in the labor market. By flexibility it is meant “successful moves” 
during a person’s life time e.g. from school to work, from one job to another, between inactivity and work, and from 
work to retirement (European Commission, 2007).  By security it is not only meant securing ones current job but 
preparing one with the skills that qualify them to progress in their working life (European Commission, 2007). 
Moreover, security aspect of this policy focuses on unemployment benefits to assist moves from one job to another. 
The last dimension of flexicurity is about education and training of all workers but especially the old and low skilled 
workers.  
The European Union suggests that, based on EU’s own and member states’ experiences, flexicurity policies can be 
formulated and implemented only if they contain four policy components: “Flexible and reliable contractual 
arrangements (This includes broad coverage of social protection provisions), Comprehensive lifelong learning (LLL) 
strategies (to ensure the continual adaptability and employability of workers), Effective active labor market policies 
(ALMP) (help people cope with rapid change, reduce unemployment spells and ease transitions to new jobs), Modern 
social security systems (provide adequate income support, encourage employment and facilitate labor market mobility 
and healthcare)” (European Commission, 2007). There are several good experiences of implementing employment 
policies inspired from flexicurity in some member states such as Denmark and Netherland. 
The Danish labor market demonstrates a successful example for flexicurity, “offering flexible labor laws and 
relatively low job protection, extensive efforts on lifelong learning and active labor market policies, and a generous 
social security system” (European Commission, 2007). “Skills development was encouraged by a method of job 
rotation, letting employees to train while unemployed people provisionally substitute them. Together, with flexible 
contractual arrangements, substantial social security and welfare schemes and extensive active labor market policies 
constitutes Danish system” (European Commision, 2007). Denmark is characterized by “very high employment rates 
(77.4% in 2006), very low unemployment (3.9%), youth unemployment (7.7%) and long-term unemployment (0.8%), 
high job turnover (one fourth of employees having been with the same employer for less than one year), high 
participation in lifelong learning (27.4%), low at-risk-of poverty rate (12%) and a high general feeling of security 
among the population” (European Commision, 2007). 
In the Dutch system, part-time jobs are mostly open-ended contracts and should not be confused with ‘risky 
employment’ (European Commision, 2007). The Dutch employees, mostly females, voluntarily sign such contracts.  
The Dutch system contains: “(1) limiting the consecutive use of fixed-term contracts to three (the next contract being 
open-ended); (2) eliminating obstacles for temporary agencies; (3), recognition of fixed-term and temporary agency 
contracts in the labor code and introducing minimum protection and payment. Temporary agency workers would be 
covered by a collective agreement providing wage guarantees, training and supplementary pension” (European 
Commission, 2007). Employment rates are high, in general “(74.3% in 2006) as well as for women (67.7%). 
Employment in full-time equivalents is lower due to the high part-time rate. Unemployment is low (3.9%), and so are 
youth unemployment (6.6%) and long-term unemployment (1.7%). Participation in lifelong learning is relatively high 
(15.9%). At 11%, the at-risk of-poverty rate is relatively low” (European Commission, 2007). 
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Consequently, it can be claimed that, based on the findings demonstrated, the EU is quite strict in some aspects of 
working life, especially fields relating rights at work are heavily regulated and there are severe rules adopted and 
implemented by the EU and member states which are mostly pro-employee. So, this indicates that the EU considers 
living, working and health conditions of the workers as utmost importance in working life. Although, not trading off 
of these principles, the EU employment policy tends to move to a direction of a more flexible labor market model 
from the old robust job security model. However, this has not to be confused that job security is unimportant for the 
EU, contrary it is argued that combined approach of flexicurity would ensure job security, as well. Accordingly, it can 
be suggested that the EU elaborates on employee rights and paves the way of employers. As a candidate country 
Turkey is also expected to comply with those policies that are effective in the EU. In the following section current 
employment policy of the Turkey would be elaborated and the level of compliance with that of the EU’s would be 
presented.  
Turkey’s Efforts to comply with the EU Employment Policy 
Discussing the employment in Turkey has to start with indication that labor market in Turkey is fragmented. On the 
one hand it is fragmented as registered and unregistered employment; on the other hand within the registered field, 
there are also a highly secured segment and segment of which job security is neglected. There is not much to say 
about unregistered employment since no reliable data exist about this kind of employment to analyze or discuss. 
However, the segments within registered employment are open to be discussed and maybe this fragmentation of labor 
market constitutes one of the main dichotomies in Turkish employment policy. Employees of public sector, unionized 
workers of private sector and higher-up service employees formed the first segment of which are provided by good 
salaries and job security. The other segment is constituted by remaining workers of labor market, almost 75% of 
registered workers, including employees in agricultural sector, construction sector, service sector, self-employed 
workers etc. (ETF, 2011) They move from one job to another and as they do not have the power to sign good contracts 
and guard their rights, they remain unprotected and they could not enjoy a job security and the benefits of social 
security system. Thus, the main problem in Turkish employment policy is seemed as the lack of a certain degree of 
standardized approach to all segments of labor market.  As the paper progressed, the readers have to bear in their mind 
that developments in employment policy in Turkey may not have same effect on different segments of labor market. 
So, a pre-suggestion for Turkish employment policy may be offering Turkish authorities to narrow the gap between 
the segments in labor market.   
The current labor law of Turkey has entered into force in 2003 which regulates the relations between employees and 
employers. Some provisions of the labor law have been intended to address expectations of International Labor 
Organization and the EU.  Two components of the law reflect the principle of flexibility. First, uncommon forms of 
employment, including part-time work, on-call work, fixed term contracts and temporary employment have been 
recognized by this act. Secondly, a Job Security Act has been incorporated into this law which changed the rules of 
employment termination. No need to mention that all these changes are available for primary workers, excluding 
unregistered workers, which have already extreme “flexible” conditions, and for a small part of the secondary segment 
of registered workers.  Therefore, the changes made in Turkish Labor law for providing more flexibility in line with 
EU’s flexicurity principle made Turkish labor market even more flexible considering the wide informality.  
The other integral component of flexicurity is providing reliable and effective lifelong learning systems for 
employees. Training opportunities after formal education is quite limited in Turkey, and thus this dimension of 
flexicurity is not at a satisfactory point (ETF, 2011). Apart from very limited opportunities offered by İŞKUR, 
Vocational Training Centers and Public Education Centers of Ministry of National Education, the only way to develop 
skills is to be sent to vocational schools at the age just after the primary school, which are disputable in terms their 
efficiency.     
The third component of EU’s flexicurity is the existence of a well-functioning modern social security system. The 
social security system of Turkey based on two dimensions. First, there is the social insurance aspect which insures 
employees and their dependents against risks of health, unemployment and retirement. Second, social assistance 
aspect of the social security system of Turkey has the objective of reduce poverty in the society. The unemployment 
insurance is a relatively new component for Turkish employment policy, it has been introduced in 1999 and it is very 
demanding to be allowed to benefit from it and, thus, the beneficiaries from this insurance scheme remained quite 
limited. After introduction of unemployment insurance in 1999, adopting labor law in 2003, the reform process 
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continued with unifying three main social security institutions into one which is Social Security Institution (SSI) in 
2008. The SSI covers 81% of the population but only 27% of its members are actively working the remaining are 
either dependents of workers or retired people (ETF, 2011, p. 68).  However, this new insurance system has not 
covered the employees other than the one who have full-time indefinite contracts. Although the new labor law allowed 
new forms of employment, SSI does not fully cover these uncommon employments. Thus, this system of social 
security forces people to keep their jobs instead of positive mobility in labor market. Informal workers are not covered 
by this system, either. Therefore, it can be argued that the Turkish social security system does not encourage 
employees for mobility in labor market since, it does not provide decent income when the employees are absent from 
the labor market.  
In terms of health and safety at work the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is the top authority in Turkey.   
Together with the ministry, four main institutions operate in health and safety issues at work (EU-OSHA, 2014). The 
first one is Directorate General of Occupational Health and Safety. It has competence on preparing legislation, policy 
producing, providing legal authorization for individuals, institutions and organizations involved in Occupational 
Health and Safety. Additionally, it makes measurements at workplaces and sets measurement standards. The second 
institution dealing with health and safety issues at work is Labor Inspectorate Board which make scrutinizes the 
workplaces to see if they comply with the health and safety regulations. There is third institution which is also 
affiliated with the Ministry is Training and Research Centre for Labor and Social Security responsible for organizing 
trainings about health and safety issues for concerned parties. Finally, SSI is also one of the institutions dealing with 
health and safety issues by collecting and analyzing data about working life and provides compensations in case of 
occupational accidents and diseases. However, as it is seen all these organizations are state institutions, thus they are 
highly centralized institutions and work, as many of the state institutions in Turkey, under heavy bureaucratic rules 
which prevent them to react on time on many issues especially on urgent ones. There is a strong requirement in 
Turkey for independent, decentralized and specialized institutions to deal with health and safety issues at work.  
As a final point, until recently, the issues concerning health and safety at work were regulated by labor law. In 30 June 
2012 Turkey adopted a new act specifically focusing on health and safety issues at work with the number of 6331 
which addresses the issues articulated in (89/391/EEC, 1989).  Although a positive step forwards, with the 
institutional scheme drawn above it would be quite optimistic to expect a full and proper implementation of this act.   
Conclusion 
The main focus of the study has been the policy convergence on employment policy that took place since the starting 
of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU. The patterns of policy change at national level were taken as 
the dependent variable to be observed and the European Union’s conditionality has been the independent variable that 
alters the national patterns. In order to analyze the impact of the EU on Turkey’s employment policy the main 
question was formulated as “To what extent does the EU have influence on policy convergence in a candidate country 
that does not have a clear membership perspective?” and ‘Employment and Social Policy chapter in accession 
negotiations between Turkey and the EU’ has been chosen as the case of this research as providing to have an answer 
on this question. It has been argued in this study that “without a concrete incentive, European Union’s impact on a 
candidate country would be limited”. Thus, the main objective of this paper was ‘analyzing the extent of EU influence 
on Turkish employment policy.’   Secondary questions designed to address systemically the main research question 
and prove the hypothesis was as follows: What are the theories that explain policy convergence? What is European 
Employment approach? What are the issues concerning employment in Turkey-EU accession negotiations? What are 
the expectations from Turkey and the changes occurred in Turkish employment policy? Do any of the integration 
theories fit with this case?   
Concerning the first question it has been argued that theoretically and empirically, measuring the influence of the EU 
on candidate countries has been a tough issue. Theoretically, the literature on Europeanization is usually deals with 
EU governance, institutional change, supranational policy formulation, policy convergence in member states 
(Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, 2005). Moreover, even if 
literature deals with a candidate country, empirically, domestic structures of subject countries, and the EU perception 
of those countries and the incentives offered by the EU to them are usually neglected. Although the number of 
literature dealing with non-member states is increasing, the bulk of the literature on EU influence on domestic 
structures generally focused on member states not candidate countries (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, Introduction: 
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Conceptualizing the Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, 2005). However, the most interesting cases for 
Europeanization, like Turkey and other candidate or neighbor countries, left understudied as the literature moves to 
investigate the precise mechanisms of EU influence (Knill & Lehmkuhl , 2003), (Borzell & Risse, 2003).    This 
makes for a substantial selection preference that affects the outcomes of academic inquiry. However, the dependent 
variable constitutes the basic conceptual problem that what is measured when the European Impact is measured. 
Compliance of the candidate states with the EU rule has been analyzed by many researchers, such as: transposition of 
EU law into their national laws, convergence of some policy areas, institutional change and   changing domestic 
political and economic practices substantially formulized in Copenhagen Criteria and Maastricht Criteria.  
It has been claimed in this study that although with some limitations of convergence theories, misuse of some terms 
and deviation in some theoretical concepts concerning EU – Turkey relations; Europeanization together with 
institutionalism and conditionality have been suggested as explanatory theoretical framework for policy convergence 
in EU – candidate country relations.  There are several theories, especially institutionalist theories such as historical 
institutionalism, constructive institutionalism or rational institutionalism. Nevertheless, only Rational Institutionalism 
explicitly deals with the effect of conditionality used by the EU on candidate countries which is the independent 
variable of this study. In this study the main argument was that the effectiveness of conditionality is based on a 
credible membership perspective. Accession to the EU has been presented as the most important reward and 
motivation that the EU can offer, but it requires being credible.  
The paper handled the employment policy of the EU through two important aspects of it. First, rights at work in the 
EU, especially health and safety issues has been dealt; then respond of the EU against harsh globalization in 
employment policies, namely the flexicurity approach has been evaluated. EU set certain rights for workers about 
health and safety at work, equal opportunities for women and men, protection against discrimination, labor law. 
Member states have to comply with those EU employment rules laid down by concerned directives. The EU has the 
greatest influence on the area of health and safety at work which has a clear legislative framework. The directive 
89/391/EEC on health and safety at work constitutes the general framework and contain measures to improve safety 
and health at work, such as: encouraging occupational health and safety in all sectors, promoting workers’ rights to 
propose on health and safety issues, and protect workers and ensure their good health at the workplace (89/391/EEC, 
1989).  
The employment approach of the EU is quite a strict one. It has basically two main dimensions: first the EU aims to 
provide at least minimum of standards regarding health, safety, working and living conditions, and social cohesion 
among its citizens; second the EU does not want the fair competition to be jeopardized by labor and work related 
inequalities in member states. However, the EU still has some serious problems regarding employment, all those 
standards set by the EU and national governments create a heavy burden for both governments and businesses in the 
EU. They are subject to both a severe global competition and thus, changing rules of businesses which have direct 
effect on employment regimes of member states. So, the EU faced a dilemma of securing the jobs and easing 
businesses to compete with their competitors and adapt the changing rules of business making since 1990s. In other 
words, the labor markets, employment and working conditions wanted to be more flexible on the one hand; in contrast 
there is also a resilient claim to provide security for workers, especially more vulnerable group of workers.  
The EU responded this dilemma by inventing a new approach in employment: Flexicurity. The logic behind the 
flexicurity approach is to achieve the targets of providing more and better jobs and simultaneously reform the 
European social models. Policies that deal with both the flexibility of labor markets, work organization and industrial 
relations; and employment and social security are needed. So, approach of flexicurity targets to ensure an EU citizen a 
high level employment security (European Commission, 2007). It also targets helping employers and workers to catch 
the prospects brought by globalization.  Thus, it creates an employment situation which security and flexibility can be 
existed together. So, flexicurity can be defined as: combined strategy to promote, simultaneously, flexibility and 
security in the labor market. By flexibility it is meant “successful moves” during a person’s life time e.g. from school 
to work, from one job to another, between inactivity and work, and from work to retirement (European Commission, 
2007).  By security it is not only meant securing ones current job but preparing one with the skills that qualify them to 
progress in their working life (European Commission, 2007). Moreover, security aspect of this policy focuses on 
unemployment benefits to assist moves from one job to another. The last dimension of flexicurity is about education 
and training of all workers but especially the old and low skilled workers.  
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Turkey, as a candidate country, is expected to comply with all of the EU rules and complete the accession negotiations 
with the EU. Social and Employment Policy is one the topics in accession negotiations which is anticipated to be 
converged with the EU’s. The first major attempt of Turkey was the adoption of a new labor law in 2003. By this law, 
especially the requirements of EU’s flexicurity have also wanted to be met. First, uncommon forms of employment, 
including part-time work, on-call work, fixed term contracts and temporary employment have been recognized by this 
act. Secondly, a Job Security Act has been incorporated into this law which changed the rules of employment 
termination. However, the changes made in Turkish Labor law for providing more flexibility in line with EU’s 
flexicurity principle made Turkish labor market even more flexible considering the wide informality in Turkish labor 
market. The other integral component of flexicurity is providing reliable and effective lifelong learning systems for 
employees. Training opportunities after formal education is quite limited in Turkey, and thus this dimension of 
flexicurity is not at a satisfactory point (ETF, 2011). The third component of EU’s flexicurity is the existence of a 
well-functioning modern social security system. The social security system of Turkey based on two dimensions; social 
insurance and social assistance. However, this new insurance system has not covered the employees other than the one 
who have full-time indefinite contracts. Although the new labor law allowed new forms of employment, SSI does not 
fully cover these uncommon employments. Thus, this system of social security forces people to keep their jobs instead 
of positive mobility in labor market. Informal workers are not covered by this system, either. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the Turkish social security system does not encourage employees for mobility in labor market since, it 
does not provide decent income when the employees are absent from the labor market.  
In terms of health and safety at work the Ministry of Labor and Social Security is the top authority in Turkey. 
Together with the ministry, four main institutions operate in health and safety issues at work (EU-OSHA, 2014). As a 
final point, until recently, the issues concerning health and safety at work were regulated by labor law. In 30 June 
2012 Turkey adopted a new act specifically focusing on health and safety issues at work with the number of 6331 
which addresses the issues articulated in (89/391/EEC, 1989).  Although a positive step forwards, with the 
institutional scheme drawn above it would be quite optimistic to expect a full and proper implementation of this act. 
However, all these organizations are state institutions, thus they are highly centralized institutions and work, as many 
of the state institutions in Turkey, under heavy bureaucratic rules which prevent them to react on time on many issues 
especially on urgent ones. It is argued that there is a strong requirement in Turkey for independent, decentralized and 
specialized institutions to deal with health and safety issues at work.  
To conclude, the area of employment policy requires numerous legislations and very effective organizations that can 
respond every development in the field. Moreover, the industrial relations in every country are deeply institutionalized 
and it is very difficult to make any change on them. However, there is the pressure of globalization on the European 
countries including Turkey and in order to survive or pursue at least their current situation in the world economy they 
have to comply with the changing rules of business making. Total surrendering to this pressure has not been chosen by 
the European countries as the way of dealing with it, but a way of compromising between globalization and social 
security and cohesion has been found and named as flexicurity. Thus, the EU continued to secure the employees from 
market pressures, but at the same time paves way to employers. Turkey is also expected to comply with policies. 
However, to reorganize labor market in Turkey is quite expensive and needs a generous budget; it requires a serious 
capacity building in the administration and incorporation of all segments of the labor market into the legal space. 
These are tough issues to be handled properly and require a high level of enthusiasm and determination.  The other 
candidate countries, now member states, presented that enthusiasm and determination, since they have been supported 
by considerable amounts financial sources and they had the clear perspective of membership even the date of their 
accession was already set. However, Turkey could not have been received that amount of financial support and she 
has not been given a clear perspective of membership as the former candidates had. Thus, Turkey has not wanted to be 
considered as not working to comply with the EU rules and adopts some laws and regulations in certain fields, but 
refrain to invest too much financial resource for an unclear future membership of the EU.  
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